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Chapter 8
Pecuniary Mistakes? Payday Borrowing
by Credit Union Members
Susan P. Carter, Paige M. Skiba, and Jeremy Tobacman
This chapter examines how households choose between financial pro-
ducts. We build from three main contexts. First, the realm of options
most households face is large and complicated, especially for households
with low levels of financial sophistication (Lusardi and Mitchell, 2007,
2009). Lusardi and Tufano (2009) show in particular that people with
lower levels of ‘debt literacy’ are more likely to use expensive sources of
financing, such as payday loans. This past work invites a search for situa-
tions where it appears consumers could make better financial decisions.
Second, we study the context of a category of financial institutions that,
as specified in their charters, have the purpose of benefiting their customer-
members. Credit unions are not-for-profit financial cooperatives that
are governed by their members, who historically had to be united by a
‘common bond of occupation or association, or belong to groups within
a well-defined neighborhood, community, or rural district’ according to
the Federal Credit Union Act of 1934. In 1935, only about 1 percent of the
population belonged to a credit union, but by the end of 2008 there were
7,806 state and federal credit unions in operation with 88.5 million mem-
bers and $811 billion of assets. In 2007, total household saving and loans
outstanding in credit unions reached $632 billion and $527 billion, respec-
tively. The credit union share of outstanding loans is about 4 percent.
Although credit unions have become increasingly important in the past
several decades, economists have studied them infrequently. Most of the
existing scholarship has focused on competition between credit unions
and commercial banks and the effects on the deposit rates of both institu-
tions (Emmons and Schmid, 1999, 2000; Feinberg, 2001, 2002). The other
area of focus for research on credit unions has been the effects of credit
union governance rules (Davis, 2001) and consolidation of credit unions
through mergers and acquisitions (Goddard et al., 2009). The two studies
closest to ours study consumer financial decision-making and credit un-
ions. Rauterkus and Ramamonjiarivelo (2010) analyze the determinants of
credit union deposits, and Bubb and Kaufman (2009) explain theoretically
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and empirically why consumers may often receive better terms on financial
products from credit unions than from for-profit financial institutions.
Third, with this chapter we seek to interface with the literature on the
‘liquid debt puzzle’. This term refers to the observation that many debtor
households in fact have low-interest paying liquid assets which they could
use, at least in part, to pay off higher-interest debt. Gross and Souleles
(2002) found, ‘over 90 percent of people with credit card debt have some
very liquid assets in checking and saving accounts, which yield at most 1 to
2 percent’. Not all authors consider this fact pattern puzzling, and Zinman
(2007) provides a particularly careful treatment of explanations for ‘bor-
rowing high and lending low’ that are consistent with rational choice
models. Our view is that the probability is a liquid debt puzzle is really
present and is increasing with the size of the interest losses. In this chapter,
we describe borrowing high and lending low as a ‘pecuniary mistake’ and
we try to measure its size, while reserving judgment about whether ‘ratio-
nality’ can generate the behavior.
A variety of alternative decision-making perspectives are consistent with
the presence of ‘pecuniary mistakes’. Lusardi (2007) points out that mis-
takes in financial planning are not rare, and that without proper financial
guidance, individuals may routinely fail to save enough for retirement,
invest in assets that are too risky or too conservative, and not take advantage
of what the employer matches. These points emphasize that an individual’s
level of financial literacy is associated with the types of sources he/she relies
on for advice, and more broadly with how efficiently he/she manages his/
her financial resources.
Other sources of information about ‘liquid debt puzzles’ and payday
loans include the following. First, the 2008 Survey of Consumer Finances
found that one-third of payday borrowers had been denied some type of
loan within the past five years, compared to one-tenth of non-payday
borrowers (Logan and Weller, 2009). Second, Agarwal et al. (2009) per-
form a similar study to ours using matched administrative datasets of credit
cards and payday loans. They find that people took out payday loans when
liquidity on their credit card was still available at a lower interest rate.
Specifically, average interest losses in their study were $200 over a three-
year period. Quantitatively, those results resemble our finding here of an
average of $88 in interest losses during an observation period of six-and-a-
half months. In this chapter, we include checking account balances, in
addition to alternative sources of loans, which likely is causing our results to
be even higher.
In this chapter, we introduce a new administrative credit union dataset,
provide some new evidence from it on basic transaction patterns, report
our findings on ‘pecuniary mistakes’, and briefly discuss our results and
conclusions.
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Credit union dataset
We conduct our analysis using a proprietary transaction-level dataset from a
credit union with more than half a million members. In the case of this
particular credit union, access is restricted to people living in the region
where the credit union operates and to people working for a particular
company that sponsors the credit union. Historically, credit unions—which
are not-for-profit—have accepted restrictions on membership in exchange
for tax-exempt status.
The dataset includes a population of 3,845 members who had an elec-
tronic debit to a payday lender during our observation period (January 1,
2006 to June 14, 2006), plus a representative random sample of 12,467
other credit union members who do not borrow from the payday lender.
Of this sample, we restrict the data to the 15,478 members who were in the
dataset for the whole time period.
For all credit union members in the sample, we have information on the
dates and amounts of credits and debits in their checking, saving, and line
of credit accounts during the period of observation. A total of 2.75 million
transactions are included, representing an average of about one per mem-
ber per day. The dataset also includes information on members’ initial
balances, allowing computation of balances and available liquidity at any
point in time. In addition, we observe members’ Fair Isaac Corporation
(FICO) scores on January 11, 2006 and March 26, 2006, and internal
customer scores assigned to them by the credit union at the time of the
most recent application for credit. Finally, the dataset flags electronic
debits to the local market-leading payday lender.
Transaction patterns and credit scores
of payday borrowers
Table 8.1 shows summary statistics for both the representative random
sample and for the payday borrowers in our dataset. The FICO scores
(pulled on January 11, 2006 and March 26, 2006) are lower for payday
borrowers. Additionally, payday borrowers tend to have a decrease in their
FICO scores from January 11 to March 26, while the change in credit score
of nonpayday borrowers is quite small. This result could suggest that payday
borrowers are having financial troubles that cause them to not pay their
debts (lowering their score), or that payday borrowers, in general, make
poor choices that lead to lower scores.
Table 8.1 also reports a high frequency of transactions made by payday
borrowers. Over the whole sample period, payday borrowers made an
average of 364 total transactions, relative to 123 made by the random
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sample. The cause of this previously undocumented fact remains unclear.
One hypothesis is that payday borrowers have fewer accounts outside this
credit union, and hence use these accounts more. Alleviating financial
stress may be more challenging to the extent stressed households create
costs for financial institutions by making more transactions of small dollar
amounts.
Pecuniary mistakes?
Previous papers have shown that people often make pecuniary mistakes by
taking out more expensive loans when cheaper substitutes are available.
With access to information on the amounts available in customers’ lines of
credit, checking accounts, and saving accounts, we can determine whether
they could have reduced their interest rates by borrowing elsewhere, or
whether they could have avoided borrowing altogether. Our estimates are a
lower bound because we lack information on other loan options available
to the payday borrower (such as liquidity on a credit card).
To find the amount available to customers in their Line of Credit (LOC) on
any given day, we first took the LOC limit given on January 1 andApril 1. Then,
by calculating the running balance of LOC (determined by the initial balance
Table 8.1 Summary statistics
Credit union
representative sample
Credit union payday
borrowers
FICO 1/11/2006 720 (83.3) 584 (84.7)
FICO 3/26/2006 720 (68.0) 581 (69.5)
Percent above low CU score threshold 96 76
Provide above high CU score threshold 82 31
Total number of transactions 123 (167) 364 (199)
Number of checking transactions 105 (159) 338 (192)
Mean absolute checking transactions ($) 295 (627) 145 (86.7)
Average number of payday loans 0 3.28 (2.69)
Average payday loan amount ($) 0 449 (220)
Average payday loan interest paid ($) 0 175 (171)
Total liquidity on 1/1/2006 ($) 6,529 (22,469) 832 (2,434)
N 11,824 3,654
Notes: Summary statistics for a representative sample of members of the credit union and for
the population of members who had an electronic payment to a payday lender during the
observation period (1/1/2006–6/14/2006). Standard deviations are in parentheses. The CU
score thresholds affected access to credit from the credit union and affected the interest rate.
All differences between columns are significant at the 1 percent level.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on administrative data from a credit union; see text.
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on January 1 minus any credits to the LOC and plus any debits), we found
the LOC available on any day to be the LOC limit minus the LOC balance.
Some people in the dataset have a zero LOC limit on January 1 but a
positive LOC balance. These people had their account closed and were just
paying off their balance. Based on the January 1 and April 1 LOC limits,
70.1 percent of payday borrowers have a zero LOC limit. In a similar fashion
to the line of credit, to find checking and saving account levels, we used the
initial balance on January 1 and added or subtracted debits or credits made
to the account over time.
We inferred the amount of a customer’s payday loan from the repayment
amount (which is known from the electronic debit) and the interest rate
(which is fixed here by state law). We then estimated interest losses using a
maximally conservative method.
We computedminimum levels of liquidity from LOCs, checking accounts,
and saving amounts between payday loan repayments. We then compared
the estimated payday loan amount to the amount available in each of the
consumer’s accounts, and total liquidity combined across accounts. Assum-
ing that consumers take out payday loans when their accounts were at a
minimum gives a lower bound for the percent of ‘mistakes’ made.
Figure 8.1 illustrates the dynamics of an individual’s checking, line of
credit, and saving accounts from fifty-six days before to fifty-six days after
the first payday loan repayment was made (for the sample of payday loan
borrowers who took out their first payday loan between February 23 and
April 18, 2006). Checking account balances start to rise five days before the
payday loan repayment. The checking account balance then begins to fall,
starting on the day the payday loan repayment was made and continues to
fall until about ten days afterward. The typical payday borrower makes depos-
its several days in advance in order to cover payday loan repayments, but then
checking account balances continues to fall for days after the payment, before
leveling off again. Their LOC available balance and saving balance remain
steady but are continuously rising throughout the time period.
To estimate the interest losses from not using a line of credit, we first
need to estimate the alternative interest rate from using money from a
member’s checking account or line of credit. We restrict the length of loan
to be forty-five days, which is the maximum length a person can take out a
payday loan in this state, and estimate what the interest payment would be if
the borrower used line of credit instead of a payday loan; in other words, if
a payday borrower took out a payday loan during this time period, we make
his/her alternative option (taking out a line of credit or using a checking
account balance) to be as expensive as possible. We add up all available
balances in the borrower’s account on the day of his/her minimum
balance and compare it to the estimated payday loan. If a borrower had
$100 in his/her accounts while taking out a $200 payday loan, then his/her
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loss would be the 100 dollars times the interest payment on a line of credit
for forty-five days. Using this method, we find the average loss per payday
loan borrower to be $87.91 over the six-and-a-half month period. The
spread of losses is depicted in Figure 8.2.
We next consider what characteristics predict these pecuniary ‘mistakes’.
In Table 8.2 we regress the losses for credit union members on character-
istics of the borrower that were known at the beginning of the period
(FICO scores, checking, savings, line of credit, and VISA balances and
availability) using OLS. In Columns 1 and 2, we run regressions restricting
the sample to people who take out at least one payday loan. Not surprisingly,
people with lower FICO scores are more likely to make losses. Interestingly,
borrowers with higher checking account balances on January 1 are more
likely to make more losses, while people with greater LOC balances on
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Figure 8.1 Liquidity over time
Notes : This figure reports the evolution of several forms of household liquidity
around the time of credit union members’ first observed payday loan repayments.
We restrict the sample to individuals who are observed for fifty-four days before and
fifty-four days after the repayment (i.e., to individuals whose first repayments
occurred between 2/23/2006 and 4/18/2006).
Source : Authors’ calculations based on administrative data from a credit union;
see text.
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January 1 also make more losses. In Columns 3 and 4 we include the
random sample of credit union members and weight the sample to repre-
sent all members at the credit union at this time. Nonpayday loan bor-
rowers have zero losses from payday borrowing. As before, we find that
members with lower FICO scores and higher line of credit balances on
January 1 are more likely to have greater losses. Checking account balance
is no longer significant. Line of credit and VISA account limits (as well as
availability) in January are significant predictors of losses; however, the line
of credit limit is significantly negative, while the VISA limit is positive. The
magnitude of the effects are, however, close to zero.
Finally, we study the impact that access to credit outside payday lending
has on an individual’s decision to take out a payday loan. In Figure 8.3, we
plot the number of payday loans taken out over this time period on the
credit scores (represented on the graph as the standard deviation of the
credit score and centered around the credit score mean). As one can see in
the graph, the number of payday loans is approximately level at lower
credit scores, but starts to fall as credit scores get even higher. We use a
regression discontinuity approach to estimate whether a cut-off for line of
credit interest rates significantly impact the number of payday loans used.
If there is a significant change at the credit score cut-off, it would indicate
that the mere access to the credit is causing a jump in the number of payday
loans. Our results indicate some evidence that at the first cut-off for a
change in interest rates there is a significant change in the slope and
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Figure 8.2 Histogram of pecuniary losses
Notes : Losses incurred from use of payday loans instead of other liquidity from
1/1/2006 to 6/14/2006.
Source : Authors’ calculations based on administrative data from a credit union;
see text.
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level of payday loans. These results are expanded more in the Appendix to
the chapter, and they begin to explore the impact that access to liquidity
elsewhere has on the use of payday loans.
Conclusion
This chapter highlights several characteristics about payday borrowers asso-
ciated with making pecuniary mistakes. First, payday borrowers had lower
credit scores and their scores were falling over the time. Second, payday
borrowers made almost three times as many transactions as nonpayday
borrowers, and payday borrowers’ typical transaction sizes are half as large
as nonpayday borrowers’ transaction sizes. Third, payday borrowers accumu-
lated checking account liquidity in order to repay their payday loans.
Table 8.2 Predictors of pecuniary losses from payday borrowing
Column 1 Column 2 Column 3 Column 4
FICO 1/11/2006 –0.17*** –0.17*** –0.016*** –0.016***
0.038 0.038 0.00072 0.00072
Check balance 1/1/2006 0.0039*** 0.0039*** 0.0000019 0.0000019
0.0011 0.0011 0.0000015 0.0000015
Savings balance 1/1/2006 0.00098 0.0010 0.0000028*** 0.0000028***
0.0025 0.0025 0.00000064 0.00000064
LOC balance 1/1/2006 0.0078*** 0.0079*** 0.00024*** 0.00020***
0.0025 0.0010 0.000033 0.000030
LOC limit 1/1/2006 0.000062 –0.000038***
0.0026 0.0000058
VISA balance 1/1/2006 –0.0015 0.0015 –0.000024 –0.0000040
0.0032 0.0014 0.000015 0.000013
VISA limit 1/1/2006 0.0031 0.000020***
0.0028 0.0000029
LOC available 1/1/2006 0.0001 –0.000038***
0.0026 0.0000058
VISA available 1/1/2006 0.0031 0.000020***
0.0028 0.0000029
Constant 176.15*** 176.15*** 12.38*** 12.38***
22.20 22.20 0.54 0.54
N 3,238 3,238 12,894 12,894
Adjusted R2 0.027 0.027 0.0075 0.0075
Notes : By regressing losses from using payday loans on initial characteristics, Table 8.2 identi-
fies predictors of pecuniary mistakes. Columns 1 and 2 include only people who took out
payday loans between 1/1/2006 and 6/14/2006, while Columns 3 and 4 include payday loan
borrowers and the random sample of credit union members, weighted to represent the entire
population of members at the credit union. Standard errors are reported below the coeffi-
cients. *** Indicates significance at the 1 percent level.
Source : Authors’ calculations based on administrative data from a credit union; see text.
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Comparing estimated payday loan amounts to liquidity available in the
borrowers’ checking accounts, saving accounts, and lines of credit, we
estimated losses incurred by using a payday loan rather than money avail-
able in the other accounts. These losses amounted to around $88 during
the six-and-a-half month period.
This chapter has focused on a group of borrowers—payday loan bor-
rowers with credit union accounts—that would significantly benefit by
making better financial decisions. Further work will investigate how credit
scores influence access to liquidity, the impact of such access on payday
borrowing and interest losses, and strategies that credit unions and others
can use to help consumers make good financial decisions.
Appendix
The credit union uses external and internal credit scores, as well as other
information, to determine who receives a line of credit and at what interest
rate. We know the basic external credit score cut-offs for interest rates on a
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Figure 8.3 Payday borrowing as a function of credit scores
Notes: Displays the relationship between FICO scores on 1/11/2006 and the num-
ber of payday loans taken out between that date and 6/14/2006. The FICO scores
are centered around the credit score mean and are represented in standard devia-
tions of the score. Each point represents the average number of payday loans in a
bin, where the bins have width equal to one-tenth of a standard deviation.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on administrative data from a credit union;
see text.
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line of credit used at this credit union. Given a member’s FICO score, we
can therefore estimate what level of interest payments the individual would
have to pay. Referring back to Figure 8.3, we can see that there is a
continual decline in the number of payday loans taken out as credit scores
reach a certain level. Using a regression discontinuity approach, we study
whether access to a line of credit at a lower interest rate causes a decrease in
the number of payday loans used. In simple terms, a regression discontinu-
ity examines people who have similar credit scores, but some are below the
cut-off and some are above the cut-off. Through the regression, we can
determine whether the credit score or the access to lower interest rates is
causing a difference in the use of payday loans.
We must first check whether there is a clustering of credit scores above or
below the cut-off; we, therefore, look at the density of credit scores in
Appendix Figure 8A.1. If there are jumps around the credit score cut-off,
it may indicate that something else, not the interest rate access, is causing
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Figure 8A.1 Distribution of credit union members’ credit score
Notes : Displays the distribution of credit union members’ 1/11/2006 normalized
FICO scores. The scores are centered around the FICO 1/11/2006 mean and
divided by the 1/11/2006 standard deviation.
Source : Authors’ calculations based on administrative data from a credit union;
see text.
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more payday loans. There do not, however, appear to be any significant
jumps.
We use the following regression specification to test whether there are
significant changes around the cut-off point:
NumberPDLsi ¼ b1AboveThri þ b2BelowThri þ f ðFICO AboveiÞ
þ f ðFICO BelowiÞ þ Ei
where f(·) is a function of the credit score. NumberPDLs is the number of
payday loans during our sample, but after the FICO score reported on
January 11. AboveThr (BelowThr) is a dummy indicating that the credit
Table 8A.1 Regression discontinuity
Column 1 Column 2 Column 3 Column 4
AboveThr 0.069*** 0.052*** 0.017*** 0.0060
0.0037 0.0038 0.0050 0.0066
BelowThr 0.36*** –1.44* –9.50** 22.38
0.089 0.74 4.71 37.94
FICO_Above 0.00000470*** 0.00016*** 0.0030*** 0.017***
0.00000031 0.000010 0.00031 0.0038
FICO_Below –0.00037** 0.0065** 0.054* –0.21
0.00016 0.0028 0.028 0.31
FICO_Above2 –
0.00000020***
–0.0000077*** –0.000068***
0.000000013 0.00000081 0.000015
FICO_Below2 –0.0000066** –0.00010* 0.00069
0.0000027 0.000057 0.00096
FICO_Above3 0.0000000050*** 0.000000088***
0.00000000054 0.000000020
FICO_Below3 0.000000061 –0.0000010
0.000000038 0.0000013
FICO_Above4 –
0.000000000038***
0.0000000000091
FICO_Below4 0.00000000052
0.00000000066
N 12,894 12,894 12,894 12,894
Adjusted R2 0.021 0.022 0.022 0.022
Notes : Regression of the number of payday loans taken out after 1/11/2006 and before 6/14/
2006. AboveThr (BelowThr) is a dummy indicating that the credit score is above (below) the
cut-off. FICO_Above (FICO_Below) is the FICO score for an individual above (below) the cut-
off point. We use a linear, squared, cubed, and quartic function of the credit score. The
regressions are weighted to represent all the members at the credit union. ***, **, and *
represent significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent level, respectively.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on administrative data from a credit union; see text.
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score is above (below) the cut-off. FICO_Above (FICO_Below) is the
FICO score for an individual above (below) the cut-off point. We use a
linear, squared, cubed, and quartic function of the credit score. The
regressions are weighted to represent all the members at the credit
union at this time.
The results from these regressions are shown in Appendix Table 8A.1.
The dummies for before and after the threshold are both significant in the
first three columns; however, surprisingly, the dummy for below the thresh-
old is negative in Columns 2 and 3, indicating that people below the
threshold are less likely to take out payday loans. Additional tests (not
shown) find that the levels and slopes for above and below the threshold
are significantly different in all specification, except when quartic FICO
scores are used. Similar results are found when using the number of payday
loans repaid after the FICO score reported on March 26.
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